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Abstract  
 
The Arctic has increasingly become the subject of strategic debates, prompting 
numerous actors – including the European Union (EU) – to develop Arctic strategies. 
Importantly, these strategies need to address the ‘Arctic paradox’, that is, the trade-
off between pursuing the economic opportunities arising from an increasingly ice-free 
Arctic and preventing environmental degradation in a region of central importance 
for the global climate. This paper investigates how the EU has positioned itself in this 
respect by asking to what extent its emerging Arctic policy has integrated 
environmental concerns. To do so, it initially conducts a discourse analysis of Arctic 
strategies of the EU institutions, Arctic and major non-Arctic EU member states. It finds 
that these three groups each form a ‘discourse coalition’ advocating for strong, weak 
and moderate environmental policy integration (EPI) in the EU’s Arctic policy 
respectively. A probe into the Arctic policy practice of typical representatives of these 
coalitions shows that a multi-level pattern exists which combines an EU-level pro-EPI 
discourse and action and varying member state-level commitments to EPI. The paper 
concludes by arguing that the Arctic policy at the EU level is currently ‘green by 
omission’− avoiding contentious subjects in the discourse as well as in actions − and 
discusses the implications of this finding. 
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Introduction1 
 
Profound climatic transformations have turned the Arctic, the area of the globe 
located north of the Arctic Circle, simultaneously into an environmentally highly fragile 
space and a prospective El Dorado offering numerous economic opportunities. The 
environmental degradation processes in this region, which harbours some of the 
world’s most delicate land- and sea-based ecosystems, are unequivocal: 
accelerated warming leads to biodiversity loss of “Arctic species and ecosystems 
[that] are also affected by … persistent organic pollutants, mercury … and marine 
litter” (EEA 2015: 3). Arctic warming also has well-documented and serious global 
repercussions. At the same time, though their extraction remains costly, there are 
strong expectations that permafrost thawing will provide more favourable conditions 
to attain the estimated “13% of undiscovered oil and 30% of undiscovered gas” laying 
in the Arctic ground (ibid.: 6).2 This situation is aptly captured by the notion of an ‘Arctic 
paradox’: the very extraction of hydrocarbons – and one of its consequences, climate 
change – facilitates the access to further oil and gas resources in the Arctic, which in 
turn aggravates the harmful regional and global effects of climate change (Palosaari 
& Tynkkynen 2015).  
 
These developments have turned a region that was long marginalised in global politics 
into “one of the big, strategic challenges of the 21st century” (Borg 2009). A crucial 
aspect of this challenge concerns the way of dealing with the ‘Arctic paradox’. To 
limit global temperature increase to 2°C, let alone 1.5°C, as stipulated by the Paris 
Agreement, climate scientists have argued that hydrocarbons in the Arctic should be 
‘left in the ground’ (McGlade & Ekins 2015). Given the vulnerable Arctic environment, 
this argument must be broadened to an overall abstention from potentially 
ecologically harmful activities. In other words, “[s]olving the Arctic Paradox should err 
heavily on the side of … sustainability and not development” (Russell 2015). 
 
In view of a possible future acceleration of the ‘rush’ to an increasingly ice-free Arctic, 
Arctic states such as Canada, Norway, Russia or the United States (US), and non-Arctic 
states like China (State Council Information Office 2018) and India (MEA India 2013), 
have begun to position themselves. The most prominent examples of Arctic strategies 
from non-members of the European Union (EU) are illustrative of the tensions that exist 
                                                          
1 The authors would like to thank Katja Biedenkopf and the other participants in a panel at the 
“EU in International Affairs” conference, Brussels, 16-18 May 2018, for their comments. 
2 These are said to represent a value of $35 trillion (Standish 2018). The economic opportunities 
opened up by Arctic permafrost thawing are not limited to fossil fuel extraction, but also 
concern easier access to strategic non-fuel minerals as well as the opening of maritime 
transport routes – all of which may lead to further environmental degradation. The paper 
concentrates on the arguably most lucrative and potentially most damaging opportunities 
related to fossil fuels. 
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around the Arctic paradox. The 2009 Canadian strategy speaks about the Arctic’s 
“tremendous opportunities” and “enormous economic potential” (MIAND 2009: 
introduction-5). While it initially refers to the “paramount” necessity to respect the 
environment, it ultimately goes as far as considering mining and hydrocarbon 
extraction “the cornerstones of sustained economic activity” in the North (ibid.: 15). A 
similar discrepancy characterises the 2013 US Arctic strategy, which refers to the “need 
to protect and conserve this unique, valuable, and changing environment” while 
making “the most of the emerging economic opportunities in the region”, notably by 
exploiting oil and natural gas resources (White House 2013: preface). Even less 
equivocally, Norway and Russia prioritise the Arctic’s economic potential: Norway’s 
2017 Arctic strategy emphasises the exploitation of oil and gas reserves but also of the 
Arctic’s renewable energy potential (Norwegian Ministries 2017); the 2013 Russian 
“strategy for the development of the Arctic Zone” puts economic development 
regarding transportation and extractive industries at its core, attaching limited 
importance to the environment (Russian Federation 2013). 
 
For more than a decade, the European Union and a number of its Arctic and non-
Arctic members have equally been positioning themselves on the Arctic. Given the 
specific nature of this polar region, any Arctic policy becomes necessarily a 
‘composite policy’, which must include positions on issues ranging from climate 
change and the environment to energy and mining, fisheries, regional development, 
research and transportation policies (Raspotnik 2018: 67-83). At the EU level, debates 
have therefore concentrated on “An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic” 
(European Commission & High Representative 2016). In developing any such policy, 
Art. 11 TFEU stipulates that “environmental protection requirements must be integrated 
into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities” (the so-
called environmental policy integration (EPI) principle) in order to promote “a high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment” (Art. 3 TEU, Art. 
21 TEU), act in line with the precautionary principle, and in particular combat climate 
change (Art. 191 TFEU). These provisions and the science-guided logic the EU has 
adopted in relation to its environmental policies more generally, would lead to the 
expectation that the Union strives for strong environmental protection in addressing 
the ‘Arctic paradox’. 
 
This paper investigates whether, to what extent and why the EU and its member states 
do actually take environmental concerns into account in their current Arctic policy 
documents and activities. In this context, the recent adoption of an “integrated 
European Union policy for the Arctic” does not imply that the EU possesses a full-
fledged Arctic strategy (Stępień & Raspotnik 2016a). Rather to the contrary, this 
debate, which emerged in 2008 in the context of considerations on novel maritime 
Bram De Botselier, Sofía López Piqueres & Simon Schunz 
6 
transportation opportunities in the Arctic Ocean, may have become opener over time 
given the evolving nature of Arctic geopolitics and the EU’s internal politics when it 
comes to Arctic matters (Raspotnik 2018: 90). Against this backdrop, the cognitive 
interest guiding this paper is pursued through a study inspired by Maarten Hajer’s 
‘environmental discourse’ theory and captured in the research question: to what 
extent are environmental concerns – as opposed to economic, especially energy-
related opportunities – taken into account in the EU’s and the member states’ 
discourses, possibly leading to ‘discourse structuration’, and practices, potentially 
resulting in ‘discourse institutionalisation’ regarding the Arctic (Hajer 1995; 1993)? 
 
The responses to these questions do not only contribute to the discussion about EU EPI 
in its external action (Marín Durán & Morgera 2012; Tosun & Solorio 2011), but also 
provide a better understanding of the EU’s Arctic policy from an EU foreign policy 
perspective. This fills a gap in the debates about this policy (e.g. Nengye et al. 2017), 
which have so far been confined to think tank papers and specialised Arctic journals 
(e.g. Morgunova & Westphal 2016; Wegge 2012; see, however, Raspotnik 2018; Pieper 
et al. 2011). 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: it first develops an analytical framework that defines 
and operationalises key concepts. It then conducts a discourse analysis involving the 
main strategic documents of EU institutions and member states in order to chart the 
discursive field in search of ‘discourse coalitions’, with particular emphasis on the 
degree of EPI. It finds that three coalitions with differing visions of EPI in the Arctic 
currently co-exist. The paper then compares rhetoric and action by probing into the 
existing practices of the EU itself and of two members states (Finland, France), and 
analyses the extent to which discourses have become ‘institutionalised’ as entrenched 
practices. It argues that the EU on the whole  is currently – in both its rhetoric and action 
– primarily ‘green by omission’, that is, by avoiding contentious subjects in its discourse 
and by focussing on non-controversial actions primarily in the science domain. The 
paper concludes by explaining this finding with reference to legal constraints and the 
EU-internal politics regarding the Arctic, before discussing the prospects of an EU Arctic 
policy and activity with strong attention to EPI. 
 
Analytical framework 
 
Through its three member states that are Arctic countries, the Arctic is an object of EU-
internal policy. However, most of the Arctic, especially the Arctic Ocean, fall outside 
EU jurisdiction. Therefore, “the EU acts mostly as an external actor” (Keil & Rasputnik: 
117) operating with a multi-facetted Arctic foreign policy resembling “an unconven-
tional internal/cross-border/external mix, in which the EU varies in competences, 
strengths and influence” depending on issue areas (Kobza 2015: 4). This paper 
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concentrates on two such areas – the environment and energy –, both of which are 
shared competences. However, whereas environmental matters are largely 
communitarised, the “energy article” 194 TFEU foresees a stronger role for member 
states by preserving their right to determine their energy mix.  
 
The solid anchorage of the environment in EU law and policy-making comprises the 
“environmental policy integration” principle of Article 11 TFEU. As the environment is 
considered as a cross-cutting issue in the EU, in both its internal and external policies, 
“the incorporation of environmental concerns in sectoral policies outside the 
traditional environmental policy domain” should be pursued (Runhaar et al. 2014: 233; 
Marín Durán & Morgera 2012: 30). Although Arctic policy is not a sectoral policy per 
se, it combines different sectoral policies, which is why the notion of EPI remains 
pertinent.  
 
EPI is a matter of gradation. To analyse the extent to which EPI exists in a policy field, 
one can heuristically distinguish between the two ends of a spectrum ranging from 
weak to strong EPI, the former meaning that the EU simply takes environmental 
considerations into account, the latter implying that it makes a “commitment to 
minimise contradictions between environmental and sectoral policies by giving 
principled priority” to environmental objectives over other policy goals (Alons 2017: 
1606; Lafferty & Hvoden 2003: 9). 
 
The EU has generally discursively settled for a strong support for environmental 
protection and sustainable development (which says nothing about its policy 
practice) (Vogler 2017). Yet, the ongoing debate around the EU’s still emerging Arctic 
policy represents inter alia a discursive struggle about whether environmental 
concerns should prevail. The discourses that coexist in the ‘discursive field’ surrounding 
this matter have to be understood as frames of “certain problems; that is to say, they 
distinguish some aspects of a situation rather than others” (Hajer 1993: 45-46).  
 
Particularly significant in the context of discursive struggles is the notion of “discourse 
coalition”, that is, “the ensemble of a set of story lines, the actors that utter these … all 
organized around a discourse” (Hajer 1993: 47). A group of actors adhering to the 
same discourse can come to dominate a political context under two conditions: first, 
“central actors are persuaded by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical power of a new 
discourse” (discourse structuration); second, this becomes entrenched in institutional 
practices where policies conform to the ideas of the dominant discourse (discourse 
institutionalisation) (ibid.: 47-48). 
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Starting from these concepts, the paper examines the discourses in the strategic 
documents of the main stakeholders involved in EU foreign policy-making on the 
Arctic, that is, the EU institutions themselves, in particular the European Commission 
and European External Action Service (EEAS), the Foreign Affairs Council and the 
European Parliament, but also (key) member states. The analysis focuses on the Arctic 
EU members (Denmark, Finland, Sweden) as well as four non-Arctic EU members 
(France, Germany, Italy, Spain), all of whom possess articulate positions on the Arctic.3  
 
These actors’ discourses are analysed in two respects: first, the story lines regarding the 
extent to which they consider environmental and/or economic (especially energy-
related) opportunities as important in their Arctic policies are examined; second, the 
analysis establishes the extent to which the actors perceive the EU as a platform to 
advance their Arctic policy objectives. This is of particular importance given the 
strength of the EU’s environmental acquis. A strong EU anchorage of Arctic policies 
would arguably bolster their environmental component, whereas a preference for 
national solutions leaves member states with the option of reinforcing the importance 
of other than environmental concerns.  
 
These two parameters (strong versus weak EPI, pro-EU versus pro-national solutions) 
constitute a discourse field, and the first objective of the analysis is to locate the 
different actors’ discourses on this field in order to identify possible discourse coalitions. 
In this context, strong rhetorical commitment to EPI entails the prioritisation of 
environmental objectives over those of other sectoral policies (and here specifically 
energy-related ones); moderate EPI implies a balanced approach to environmental 
risks and economic opportunities; indicative of weak EPI is a predominance of other 
sectoral policies over environmental concerns. Methodologically, this effort relies on a 
discourse analysis inspired by qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2000). It operates 
with codes related to EPI and focuses on the abovementioned actors and their main 
strategies regarding the Arctic. It covers the period since the first publication of an EU 
document on the Arctic (European Commission 2008) until 2018.  
 
The second objective of the analysis is to probe into the recent Arctic activities of one 
actor that is representative of a given discourse coalition. As explained below, the 
analysis focusses on the European Commission, Finland and France. This exercise is 
based on document analysis and semi-structured interviews. It examines the extent to 
                                                          
3 These are also the EU members that are either ‘permanent participants’ or observers in the 
Arctic Council, with the exception of Poland, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
Whereas Poland does not possess an explicit strategy, the Dutch strategy covers both the 
Arctic and Antarctic (Schulze 2017). The UK is not included in the study because – given its 
announced withdrawal from the EU – its discourse is bound to weigh less on how the Union will 
address the Arctic paradox in the future.  
EU Diplomacy Paper 3/2018 
9 
which environmental concerns shape these players’ Arctic activities, as well as 
whether these activities are in line with their rhetoric. Contrasting discourse and action 
will allow for establishing whether the former is impacting the actors’ behaviour. If the 
institutional practices conform to the detected discourses, discourse institutionalisation 
has occurred (Hajer 1993: 47-48).  
 
Concretely determining the level of EPI in a player’s activities requires, on the one 
hand, a brief overview of the ways in which the actors exploit economic, primarily 
energy-related opportunities in the region. This must, on the other hand, be 
complemented with a scrutiny of the EU’s and member states’ specific (internal and) 
external action affecting the Arctic environment. In theory, the EU (and its members) 
can directly or indirectly affect Arctic governance in three ways (Raspotnik 2018: 65-
85): first, by virtue of being a “market power”, that is, based on its legal acquis 
regulating the single market, which can – unintentionally – directly or indirectly (via the 
European Economic Area including Norway) provide incentives for non-EU countries 
to follow EU rules (Damro 2012); second, by spending money: “with the EU having 
invested over €1.14 billion in the European Arctic since 2007, [it] is a key investor in the 
Arctic” (European Commission 2014: 1), especially in the major funding areas of 
research and regional development policies; and, third, as a diplomatic actor 
engaging in both bilateral relations with non-EU Arctic countries and multilateral 
Arctic-related activities.  
 
Out of these potential leverages that the EU (and its members) can have over the 
Arctic environment, this analysis focuses on intentional action and investigates EU, 
Finnish and French Arctic research policies and multilateral actions. First, research 
policy – arguably “the flower in the buttonhole of EU policies with relevance to the 
Arctic” (Airoldi 2014: 49) – is mostly confined to the EU’s multi-annual framework 
programmes, and the analysis therefore focuses on the extent to which research 
programming and funded projects integrate environmental concerns (as opposed to 
energy-related opportunities) when it comes to the Arctic. Second, multilateral 
activities are examined by asking to what extent Finland (as a member), France (as 
an observer) and the EU (as a quasi-observer) promote environmental measures (as 
opposed to energy-related opportunities) in the Arctic Council (AC) and uphold 
Arctic-relevant multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) as well as the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the Arctic. As, contrary to the 
Antarctic, no agreement regulates Arctic issues, UNCLOS represents the main 
regulatory framework for the region. 
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Charting the discursive field of EU Arctic policy 
 
This section delves into the Arctic-specific discourses of the European Commission and 
European External Action Service (EEAS), the Council, the European Parliament, the 
EU’s Arctic members Denmark, Finland and Sweden, as well as key non-Arctic 
members (France, Germany, Italy, Spain) (see Annex for an overview of the key 
documents) with a view to locating them on the discursive field regarding EU Arctic 
policy (see Figure 1). 
 
EU institutions 
 
A first major Communication on “The European Union and the Arctic region”, drafted 
by DG Mare and DG Relex, was released in 2008. It had three key objectives: the 
protection and preservation of the Arctic, the promotion of a sustainable use of 
resources and a contribution to multilateral governance in the region (European 
Commission 2008). While advocating resource use, this use was to follow “strict 
environmental standards” (ibid.: 7). Its successor, a 2012 Joint Communication, was 
drafted in the context of the EU’s (unsuccessful) bid for observer status in the Arctic 
Council and aimed at “developing a European Union policy towards the Arctic 
Region” (European Commission & High Representative 2012). To avoid alienating 
Arctic Council members, the EU abandoned the idea of promoting multilateral ‘Arctic 
governance’ and instead focussed on non-controversial issues related to Arctic 
cooperation, notably regarding knowledge (research), responsibility (sustainable 
development) and engagement (international cooperation) (ibid.: 4; Raspotnik 2018: 
107-110).  
 
Finally, in 2016, the Commission and the High Representative, building on earlier efforts 
and on the 2014 Council “conclusions on developing an EU policy toward the Arctic 
region” (Council of the EU 2014), which had called for a low-profile policy (Raspotnik 
2018: 112), published a Joint Communication on “An integrated European Union 
policy for the Arctic”. This Communication was a step in the direction of a full-fledged 
and comprehensive EU policy towards the Arctic region, an intention underscored a 
few months later by the 2016 Council Conclusions (Council of the EU 2016).  
 
The 2016 Union’s Arctic policy largely builds on existing policy frameworks, combining 
several sectoral policies relevant to the Arctic: (i) climate change and safeguarding 
the Arctic environment, (ii) sustainable development in and around the Arctic, and (iii) 
international cooperation on Arctic issues (European Commission & High 
Representative 2016). With these foci, the Joint Communication watered down the 
three original objectives of the 2008 document which became mere ‘priority areas’. 
While these priorities and their extensive treatment point at first sight to a highly pro-
environmental stance, the Communication lacks comprehensiveness. It makes no 
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mention of the precautionary principle, and does not, for instance, address the use of 
heavy fuel oil in maritime transportation. A major shift over time can also be observed 
in the discussion related to minerals and fossil fuels extraction. While the 2008 and 2012 
documents saw the sustainable use of resources as a major challenge, the 2016 
Communication only discusses the extraction of natural resources in the context of 
international cooperation. Finally, where earlier documents had discussed the Arctic 
sensu stricto, with a focus on the Arctic Ocean, the 2016 update emphasises the 
sustainable development of the EU’s northernmost regions and the need to improve 
the integration of these regions into the EU’s internal market. This shift allows the EU to 
avoid questions related to the combination of economic development and 
environmental protection (Stępién & Raspotnik 2016a): by no longer discussing the 
Arctic Ocean per se and its energy sources, the EU fails to recall its significant energy 
dependence on Norwegian and Russian Arctic fossil fuels (EEA 2015). Ostensibly 
neglecting the environmental implications of exploiting these energy sources comes 
close to a tacit endorsement of the energy-related opportunities in the Arctic with a 
view to ensuring EU energy security. 
 
This omission notwithstanding, the Joint Communication represents a blueprint for an 
EU-level Arctic policy that leans towards strong EPI. With its 2016 ‘Conclusions on the 
Arctic’ (Council of the EU 2016), “the Council welcomed the … joint communication 
and refrained from any criticism” (Raspotnik 2018: 117). Collectively at EU level, the 
member states thus support the Commission and the EEAS’ approach, including its 
commitment to EPI. This assessment places the Commission, the EEAS and the Foreign 
Affairs Council in the upper right corner of Figure 1. 
 
The European Parliament  has – via several resolutions (2008, 2011, 2014, 2017) – equally 
been involved in the EU’s policy-making efforts regarding the Arctic. In 2008, it 
proposed an Arctic regime drawing upon the Antarctic Treaty, with high 
environmental protection standards (European Parliament 2008). This controversial 
proposal, not supported by any Arctic player (Wegge 2012), was abandoned in 2011, 
leading Parliament to change its focus by first calling for a comprehensive and 
coordinated EU Arctic policy in 2014, and then for a comprehensive EU strategy in 2017 
(Raspotnik 2018: 105-107). 
 
The 2017 European Parliament resolution is by far the most detailed, particularly with 
regard to the environment (European Parliament 2017). It lists all possible 
environmental agreements relevant to the Arctic and “underlines the importance of 
UNCLOS in providing the essential multilateral legal framework for all ocean activities, 
including in the Arctic, for the delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf and for 
settling intra-Arctic sovereignty issues as regards territorial seas” (ibid.: para. 3). The 
European Parliament thus recognises the autonomy of Arctic states regarding their 
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territorial waters, but wishes to limit their sovereignty. Contrary to the Joint 
Communication, the European Parliament does call for a ban on the use of heavy fuel 
oil (ibid.: para. 58). Nonetheless, also the Parliament’s focus on environmental policy 
integration has its limits. Following intense lobbying by Norway, the originally proposed, 
complete ban on oil drilling in Arctic waters was limited to ‘icy waters’. Through 
European Economic Area rules, these proposals also apply to Norwegian waters. 
However, as Norway already bans drilling in icy waters, these provisions have limited 
practical effect (Eriksson 2017).  
 
In sum, while clearly favouring the emergence of an EU-level Arctic strategy, the EP 
has a strong preference for EPI, placing it in the top right corner of Figure 1 – even if in 
the last years it has reduced the vehemence with which it initially defended 
environmental protection vis-à-vis economic objectives.  
 
Arctic EU member states 
 
Denmark 
 
Denmark adopted its first ten-year Arctic strategy in 2011. It applies to the entire 
Kingdom, including Greenland and the Faroe Islands, which are not part of the EU. 
Denmark is through Greenland the only EU country with access to the Arctic Ocean, 
and is therefore also comparatively less keen on EU-level Arctic action.  
 
The Danish position is aptly captured in the formula: “The huge economic potential in 
the Arctic must be realised while appreciating its human impact, i.e. the economic 
and social integration of the population and with sensitivity to environmental 
concerns” (Government of Denmark et al. 2011: 23). Its clear focus is on economic 
growth and energy opportunities. This becomes already evident when considering the 
order and degree of detail by which these issues are discussed. The strategy describes 
at length how oil, gas and minerals are (to be) extracted in Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands (ibid.: 23-25), before then adding that the highest environmental and safety 
standards will be used (ibid.: 26-27). There is, however, little explanation on how these 
two objectives will be reconciled.   
 
Environmental issues are generally alluded to, recognising the vulnerability of the 
Arctic environment and the need to protect its unique biodiversity. The strategy also 
argues that it is important to apply the precautionary principle regarding fishery 
resources and living animals if “there is a lack of adequate knowledge about 
development in previously icecovered areas” (ibid.: 32) and that knowledge on 
pollutants must be applied proactively (ibid.: 46). At the same time, it fails to recognise 
precaution as an overarching aim. 
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With its limited focus on an EU-level policy, its clear preference for economic 
development opportunities and the supplementary character of environmental 
protection considerations, the Danish Arctic strategy is placed in the upper left 
quadrant of Figure 1.  
 
Finland 
 
The Finnish Strategy for the Arctic was released in 2013 and updated in 2016. It revolves 
mainly around the economic benefits of the Arctic, paying particular attention to the 
development of Finland’s northernmost region, Lapland. It is not surprising that the 
country continues to support an enhanced EU role in the Arctic, considering that it 
successfully managed to upload its regional development focus to the EU level 
through, inter alia, the creation and then re-launching of the Northern Dimension (ND). 
The ND had been created under the auspices of the Finnish Council presidency in 
1997, but was eventually not fully implemented. The second Finnish presidency in 2006 
tried to re-launch the ND as a ‘partnership model’ with Norway, Russia and Iceland. 
While the ND was not created purely for Arctic cooperation, due to its geographical 
scope this initiative was an important stepping stone for EU involvement in the region 
(Wegge 2012).  
 
The strategic document discusses the (potential) contribution of the Finnish industry to 
the exploitation of oil and gas, renewable energy and forestry opportunities and the 
ways its industry can cooperate with partners like Greenland and Russia. The strategy 
indeed considers Finnish companies to be well-suited to participate in the extraction 
of Arctic resources, due to their expertise and experience of working in Arctic 
conditions in fields ranging from construction to ship-building (Prime Minister’s Office 
2013: 26-27). By contrast, its section on the environment is relatively short and general 
– even though the precautionary approach is mentioned as a general principle of 
managing environmental risks (ibid: 39). It recognises the sensitivity of the Arctic region, 
the negative impact of a changing climate on biodiversity and the need to pursue 
environmental monitoring. At the same time, the strategy is explicit in stating that these 
effects “also open up new opportunities” (ibid.).  
 
The 2016 update of the strategy reiterates the prioritisation of economic benefits by 
only briefly discussing the need to combat climate change and protect the 
environment, while emphasising economic opportunities such as sustainable tourism 
and the ‘commercialisation’ of Arctic expertise. The latter would allow Finland to take 
advantage of its expertise of working in cold Arctic conditions in areas such as the 
construction industry and the bioeconomy (Prime Minister’s Office 2016). 
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Finland is therefore placed in the same quadrant of Figure 1 as Denmark, albeit a bit 
higher to reflect its more pronounced pro-EU stance. 
 
Sweden 
 
The Swedish Arctic strategy dates from 2011 and is arguably more environment-friendly 
than Denmark’s (Regeringskansliet 2011). It was complemented (but not replaced) by 
a 2016 memorandum released by the Ministry of Environment and Energy on a “New 
Swedish environmental policy for the Arctic”, which focuses on environment-specific 
considerations (Regeringskansliet 2016). However, the 2011 strategy provides the 
overarching frame of Swedish Arctic policy, arguing that “Sweden will actively 
contribute to the development of an EU Arctic policy … [and] promote the EU as a 
relevant cooperation partner in the High North within relevant policy areas” 
(Regeringskansliet 2011: 18). 
 
Like the Danish strategy, the 2011 Swedish document discusses the impact of climate 
change on the Arctic, the vulnerable Arctic ecosystem and the role of pollutants, but 
stops short of referring to the precautionary principle. The 2016 memorandum by the 
Environment Ministry only mentions it specifically in the context of fisheries. 
Nevertheless, this latter document arguably represents the most environment-friendly 
of all analysed EU members’ strategies. While the 2011 strategy stated that “sensitive 
areas must be protected from exploitation” of resources (Regeringskansliet 2011: 31), 
the 2016 memorandum mentions that “the extraction of oil and gas for burning must 
be restricted” in order to limit global warming to 2°C (Regeringskansliet 2016: 4).  
 
Sweden explicitly recognises the economic opportunities in the Arctic, while stating 
that “the anticipated future extraction of natural resources … and the use of 
renewable resources” should “take place in a sustainable manner” (Regeringskansliet 
2011: 30). It claims to have no “direct national energy interests” but does see a role for 
its industry in supporting the energy sector, for instance “in the fields of ice-breaking, 
sea transport” (ibid.: 37). The strategy does not fully explain when environmental 
concerns should take priority over economic opportunities, except when referring to 
environmental assessments and to the Polar Code of the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO).  
 
Locating the Swedish discourse on the Arctic is intricate, given the existence of two 
different documents on the subject. The original Swedish strategy, while solidly pro-EU, 
falls into a similar category as Denmark’s and Finland’s with regard to EPI. It thus 
belongs into the upper left quadrant of Figure 1. By contrast, its environmentally friendly 
2016 memorandum, which is however only an add-on to the main document (see 
Schulze 2017, who does not even consider it), could place Sweden into the upper right 
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quadrant. This double-counting of Sweden is indicative of internal political cleavages 
surrounding the ‘Arctic paradox’, which in other countries have been settled through 
compromise documents. In the further analysis, the 2011 Prime Minister’s Strategy is 
considered as the key document of importance for Sweden. 
 
This overview of the three Arctic EU member states’ strategies shows that economic 
benefits receive more attention than environmental concerns, most strongly in the 
cases of Finland and Denmark. All countries recognise the vulnerability of the Arctic 
environment and the need to balance economic development with environmental 
concerns, but there is little discussion of how this would work in practice, that is, which 
dimensions should receive priority in which case(s). All three countries support a role 
for the EU in Arctic governance, but Denmark is clearly the most reluctant in this 
regard, given its longstanding defence of Greenlandic interests within the EU 
framework. 
 
Non-Arctic EU member states 
 
This section looks at four non-Arctic EU members (France, Germany, Italy, Spain), all of 
whom are observers in the AC and possess articulate positions on the Arctic. 
 
France 
 
France’s 2016 “national roadmap for the Arctic” covers scientific research, economic 
development, defence and security, the protection of the Arctic marine environment, 
France’s role in international fora, the EU, national interests and the common interest 
in the region (MFA France 2016). Like other countries’ strategies, the roadmap speaks 
of the many economic opportunities and challenges that are opening up as a result 
of climate change. Economic opportunities include international shipping, pleasure 
cruising, the extraction of mineral resources, infrastructures, satellite surveillance and 
fisheries. Noteworthy is the explicit naming of French companies whose economic 
interests in the Arctic are predicted to increase, such as Total, Engie or Technip (ibid.).  
 
The French strategy recognises the authority of Arctic coastal states to regulate 
economic activities, but suggests to work at bi- and multilateral levels to regulate the 
activities of extractive industries, bearing in mind their environmental impact and risks. 
Indeed, the roadmap expresses a belief that all “potential users of the Arctic Ocean” 
have to act responsibly to protect marine ecosystems in a context of economic 
growth (ibid.: 11, 40). In this context, it recommends to “mainstream environmental 
protection” (ibid.: 28), but remains unclear about how private companies are to abide 
by this. 
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In order to meet the “obligations of environmental ethics”, France itself is to “behave 
in an exemplary manner” (ibid.: 40). To that end, the roadmap backs the process of 
delimiting marine protected areas in the Arctic in cooperation with stakeholders, as 
well as in close collaboration with the European Commission in order to achieve a 
successful outcome in talks on the regulation of activities in the central Arctic Ocean. 
A section on “France, an Arctic player” highlights the support for the precautionary 
principle and advocates the “empowerment of the non-Arctic countries that are 
potential users of the Arctic Ocean” through an engagement in the planning and 
decision-making processes (ibid.: 60). 
 
With this roadmap, France is championing the involvement of non-Arctic countries in 
the region. Although “on the whole, the profitability of business activities in the Arctic 
still seems to be limited for French companies” (ibid.: 27), and despite the “obligations 
of environmental ethics” (ibid.: 40), the document leans towards economic and 
energy interests over environmental concerns. France sees the EU as having a ‘key’ 
role in the region (ibid.: 51-52) and believes that a more integrated EU Arctic policy will 
strengthen the EU’s bid for permanent observer status in the Arctic Council (ibid.: 53).  
 
This discourse places France into the camp of pro-EU Arctic policy member states, with 
a moderate vision of EPI. 
 
Germany 
 
The 2013 ‘guidelines’ of the Federal Foreign Office intend to place the Arctic at the 
centre of Germany’s foreign policy. Indeed, the document highlights the “great 
potential” for the German and European “industry and consumers” of Arctic energy, 
raw materials and fishing resources (Federal Foreign Office 2013: 1, 6). However, 
Germany also acknowledges the multiple dangers linked to the impact of climate 
change on the region. To mitigate these risks, the document emphasises the need to 
ensure “that the highest environmental standards are met and the principle of 
precautionary action is adhered to” (ibid.: 7). One of the suggestions put forward to 
safeguard the environment and the region’s biodiversity in a context of “positive 
economic prospects” (ibid.) consists of creating a network of marine protected areas, 
an idea also mentioned in the French roadmap.  
  
Additionally, Germany sees the need for the EU to take on a more active role in Arctic 
policy and wishes to guarantee “horizontal coherence on Arctic issues” (ibid.: 15) on 
a wide range of policies including but not limited to, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), environment, energy, maritime transport, which represents a particular 
German interest, and fisheries (ibid.; Raspotnik 2018: 121). The underlying goal for 
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Germany is “to make Arctic policy part of long-term strategic planning within the EU” 
(Federal Foreign Office 2013: 15).  
 
The German guidelines are similar to the French and Italian ones (see below) in that 
they propose national expertise in research, technology and environmental standards 
to further sustainable economic development, trying to strike a balance between 
economic and environmental concerns but ultimately tilting the balance towards the 
economic side. This places the country in a similar position as France in Figure 1. 
 
Italy 
 
In a document entitled “Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic: National 
Guidelines”, Italy dissects its interests in the region into four dimensions: political, 
environmental and human, scientific, and economic. Contrary to most other non-
Arctic EU member states’ documents, the economic section comes last, with the 
underlying goal of “sustainable development” permeating all parts of the text (MFA 
Italy 2015).  
 
In relation to the political dimension, Italy’s contribution to science and energy 
company ENI’s expertise in hydrocarbon extraction in Norway and Russia is presented 
as a factor to foster “sustainable Arctic development” (ibid.: 4). The strategy explicitly 
acknowledges the importance of the Arctic Ocean to the EU and highlights the active 
role Italy played in the drafting of the Directive on safety of offshore oil and gas 
operations. Quoting the requirement to “ensure the environmental protection of the 
Arctic” in offshore operations, Italy offers its expertise on hydrocarbon exploration and 
extraction in compliance with “the highest standards of safety and environmental 
protection” (ibid.: 5, 6).  
 
The section on the “environmental and human dimension” of the Arctic outlines key 
environmental aims: “protection of biodiversity, prevention of air pollution, reversal of 
climate change, marine conservation and integrated management of coastal zones 
… and the exploitation of natural resources as well as addressing environmental risks 
posed by transport by sea, tourism, mining and harbour operations” (ibid.: 7). 
Cooperation and exchanges with Arctic countries “can and must” provide 
development opportunities for Italy in some of those fields (ibid.). 
 
The chapter on science contains the most concrete strategic guidelines. Scientific 
knowledge is seen as key to inform policy options on economic development – in 
particular the use of natural resources – as well as on climate mitigation. One such 
guideline concerns Italy’s efforts to strengthen European Arctic infrastructure. 
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The section on economic development tries to make a case for Italian enterprises, 
notably ENI, to which a full subsection is devoted, when it comes to bringing together 
“advanced technology and the preservation of its environmental and cultural 
heritage” in the economic exploitation of the Arctic (ibid.: 16). This explicit reference 
to the Arctic stakes of national private sector ‘champions’ mirrors – but transcends by 
far – the French approach.  
 
In conclusion, although environmental concerns play a more prominent role in Italy’s 
than in the Arctic countries’ strategies, the ultimate goal seems to be that of investing 
in scientific research to pursue economic development. As is the case with other 
countries’ positions, this economic development is to be built to a large extent on the 
exploitation of fossil fuels. This places Italy, together with France and Germany, towards 
the upper centre of Figure 1. 
 
Spain 
 
The least economic-oriented document of those studied here, the 2016 “Guidelines 
for a Spanish Polar Strategy”, covers both the Arctic and Antarctica (MEIC Spain 2016). 
In line with other EU members, Spain claims that it desires to take on a more active role 
in EU policy-making in the Arctic regarding fisheries and CFSP matters. To this end, it 
proposes the formation of a Polar working group under the Council (ibid.: 14). 
 
Like the Italian document, the Spanish one discusses economic issues last, but without 
reference to national companies. The guidelines contain only a subsection on 
“sectoral issues”, which advocates a “stable, sustainable and environmentally-
friendly” economic development attaching high priority to “maintaining biodiversity” 
(ibid.: 27). Additionally, a paragraph mentions key areas of interest for Spain: natural 
resources, navigation, a vaguely formulated “commercial activity in the polar regions” 
and development of new technologies (ibid.: 28). Only the parts on fishing and 
navigation are more elaborate (ibid.). Altogether, the Spanish guidelines appear as 
the most EPI-minded document of the four non-Arctic EU member states, placing the 
country in the same category as the other three countries, but slightly more towards 
the ‘stronger EPI’ end of the spectrum.   
 
Overall, the member states studied in this section share an inclination towards 
economic interests over environmental preoccupations, albeit to different degrees. 
All strategies try nonetheless to argue that economic development can go hand in 
hand with environmental protection and offer their countries’ expertise to exploit 
Arctic resources. The EU also features in the member states’ strategies, which 
recognise its importance in Arctic affairs and support its bid for observer status in the 
Arctic Council. 
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Comparative summary: coexisting discourse coalitions 
 
The analysis reveals the co-existence of three different clusters of discourse coalitions4 
constituting the current discursive field on the EU’s Arctic policy (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: The discursive field of the EU’s Arctic policy 
 
 
Note: The countries in grey and the European Commission were selected as case studies. 
Source: authors’ compilation  
 
A first, “strong EPI, strong pro-EU” cluster brings together those actors who rhetorically 
support an important EU role in Arctic policy alongside a rather strong form of 
environmental policy integration into the Union’s Arctic policy. This cluster comprises 
the EU institutions and Sweden’s 2016 Environment Ministry’s add-on to the country’s 
2011 strategy. It contains thus those supranational actors (including the Council as 
collective voice of the member states) who will normally defend an EU position, and 
have additionally adopted a pro-environmental rhetoric. Due to the absence of 
support from any (major) EU member state, the cluster remains overall weaker. Further 
analysis will focus on the European Commission as representative of this cluster,  
 
A second, “moderate EPI, strong pro-EU” cluster comprises the non-Arctic EU members 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain, which all advocate environmental policy 
integration to some extent, with minor differences, and support an EU-level Arctic 
policy. From this cluster, the analysis will focus on France as a typical representative of 
the cluster’s shared discourse (see also Raspotnik 2018: 121). 
 
                                                          
4 These clusters are considered as ‘discourse coalitions’ not because their members have 
purposively decided to coalesce and align their discourses, but as a result of similar and 
overlapping story lines. 
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A third “weak EPI, moderate pro-EU” cluster comprises the Arctic EU members, all of 
which have a clear preference for seizing the economic opportunities offered by the 
Arctic over environmental protection needs. While Finland’s strategy and Sweden’s 
2011 strategy are moderately pro-EU, the Danish strategy may be the outlier of all 
analysed cases, which – given its relations with Greenland – is not in favour of an 
engaged EU Arctic policy (see also Raspotnik 2018: 120). Given the privileged access 
to Arctic governance fora enjoyed by the three countries, this cluster carries a certain 
weight. From this cluster, the analysis further concentrates on Finland as a typical case 
of a country whose strategies express preferences for weak EPI (Interview 6). 
 
Altogether, and answering the question to what extent environmental concerns – as 
opposed to economic, especially energy-related opportunities – are taken into 
account in the EU’s and member states’ discourses regarding the Arctic, the findings 
point to the co-existence of three discourse coalitions which largely agree on the role 
of the EU but display differing positions when it comes to the desired degree of EPI. This 
points to the fact that discourse structuration, that is, a situation in which “central 
actors are persuaded by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical power” of a single 
discourse, has not yet occurred with regard to EU Arctic policy (Hajer 1993: 47-48). 
Rather, the findings underscore that the discursive field on the EU’s Arctic policy – in 
particular with regard to the ‘Arctic paradox’ – remains wide-open. This confirms that 
“the 2016 joint communication is not a definite EU-Arctic statement but rather aimed 
to act as … guidance to Commission services” (European Commission & High 
Representative 2016: 17; Interview 5), and that the EU’s declared Arctic policy 
“remains a very diverse set of ideas, trying to reconcile contradictory values and 
interests” (Stępień & Raspotnik 2016b: 397).  
 
Probing into practice: have EU discourses on EPI in the Arctic become 
institutionalised? 
 
Based on the selection of three emblematic actors5 from each of the above discourse 
coalitions – the European Commission, Finland and France – the purpose of this section 
is to probe into their Arctic activities in order to examine to what extent (i) environ-
mental concerns (as to economic, energy-related opportunities) are taken into 
account and (ii) whether this behaviour is in line with their rhetoric, that is, whether 
discourses have impacted on practices even in the absence of discourse 
structuration. The extent of EPI in these actors’ practices is assessed by examining their 
research funding activities as well as multilateral activities in the Arctic Council and in 
                                                          
5 The three actors chosen from the clusters represent ‘typical’ cases of the respective discourse 
coalitions. This allows for employing them to illustrate the types of activities such representatives 
of a cluster undertake, bearing in mind that energy mixes and specific interests in the Arctic 
can of course vary even among actors with similar discourses. 
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support of international environmental law for the Arctic. To be able to determine this 
extent and compare rhetoric to action, this assessment is preceded by a brief 
consideration of the players’ pursuit of economic objectives in the Arctic.  
 
Pursuing economic opportunities in the Arctic 
 
The pursuit of opportunities beyond that of a diffusely defined ‘sustainable 
development’ is not explicitly formulated as an objective of the EU’s Arctic policy, and 
the EU currently is not empowered to become active in key Arctic-relevant policy 
domains. It may be able to set regulatory frameworks for its economic actors with 
regard to some of the Arctic opportunities (e.g. fishery), but does not possess the legal 
competence regarding such an important matter as the steering of the EU-28’s energy 
security policies, for instance. As article 194 TFEU foresees that the “choice between 
different energy sources and the general structure of [their] energy supply” falls upon 
member states, the latter are the first in line when it comes to exploiting already 
discovered and undiscovered Arctic fossil fuel resources. Experts estimate that there 
are “$35 trillion worth of untapped oil and natural gas under the Arctic seabed” (EEAS 
2015: 6; Standish 2018).  
 
The Commission per se may therefore not be so active when it comes to Arctic 
opportunities, but there is a strong engagement of the EU-28, notably in the energy 
domain. Almost 70% of natural gas and 41% of oil imports into the EU-28 stem from 
Russia and Norway (Eurostat 2017: 15). A significant share of these hydrocarbons is 
extracted in the Arctic (EEA 2015). European companies such as ENI and Repsol are 
already active in the Arctic and gearing up for more. ENI, which is explicitly mentioned 
as a potential beneficiary of Arctic environmental changes in the Italian Arctic 
guidelines, considers the “Arctic ... a key pillar to [its] growth” (ENI 2012). Shell (2016) 
halted its Arctic explorations in 2015 for reasons related to extraction costs and local 
unrest about its activities, but its CEO explained: “In the long run, … the world economy 
is going to need Arctic oil … a lot of the oil and gas used around the world today 
comes from the Arctic and ... it will continue to play a key role”.  
 
France makes comparatively limited use of (imported) oil and gas, accounting for 30% 
respectively 14% of total energy consumed (Commissariat Général 2016: 11). Although 
Arctic countries are among France’s key providers of gas (42.2% from Norway, 11.4% 
from Russia), they are less significant when it comes to oil (7.9% from Russia, 6.1% from 
Norway) (Ministère de l’Environnement 2016: 36, 39). Although French companies are 
active in the Arctic,6 mostly in Norway, but also in Canada and Russia (MFA France 
2016: 29), the dependence on Arctic fossil fuels is thus limited.  
                                                          
6 Interestingly, one of the companies identified in the French roadmap as potential beneficiary 
of a changing Arctic, Total, has ruled out Arctic oil drilling, citing the 2°C goal (Darby 2016). 
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The Finnish energy mix heavily relies on imported hydrocarbons, which make up 38% 
of its energy mix (oil: 23%, coal: 9%, gas; 6%) (IEA 2017). Roughly 88% of oil, 64% of coal 
and 100% of gas are imported from Russia (ibid.). Besides this reliance on Russian 
(predominantly Arctic) fossil fuels, the country is actively seeking to develop its 
northernmost region by pursuing Arctic opportunities. Most recently, Finland’s 
Ambassador for Northern Policies Mäki-Reinikka argued that there is “immense 
potential in the Arctic (…) [w]hy wouldn’t we use the opportunities that are being 
presented to us?” (Standish 2018). Illustrative of manifold activities to exploit these 
opportunities are plans to join Norway in constructing a railway route linking Lapland 
to the Norwegian port of Kirkenes, which would inter alia “provide a more direct route 
for exporting Arctic resources from the area’s lucrative mining, forestry and fisheries 
industries to Asian markets” (ibid.). The Finnish government is thus fully acting in line with 
its discourse to pursue opportunities in the region (Interview 6). 
 
This brief probe demonstrates in the first place that discourse and practice are fully 
aligned when it comes to economic opportunities. Given legal constraints, the EU 
cannot and does not really engage in exploiting Arctic opportunities, while Finland is 
openly doing so and France is prepared to do so, but to a more limited extent.  
 
Funding research on the Arctic  
 
Both the EU (Commission) and its member states have been major investors in Arctic 
research, making this one of their key regional activities. With such funding, they can 
contribute to a better knowledge base about the Arctic in manifold ways, for instance 
regarding changing environmental conditions and ways to protect this fragile 
environment. Analysing research programming and the types of activities to which 
funding is allocated is thus crucial to understand the degree of EPI pertaining to this 
component of the EU’s Arctic policy.  
 
At the EU level, funding for Arctic research goes back to the research framework 
programmes (FP) 5 and 6 (1998-2006), which fed into the International Polar Year 2007-
2009 (Raspotnik 2018: 80). During FP 7 (2007-2013), the EU then invested some € 200 mio 
into Arctic research (Immler 2014). Key themes included geo-observation and climate 
change-related research, but some projects also focussed on maritime transport, 
fisheries and resource extraction (ibid.). Under Horizon 2020 (H2020, 2014-2020), the EU 
has been continuing to fund Arctic research with a steady focus on the environment 
and climate change. This responds to the 2012 Commission and High Representative’s 
call for research to be “at the centre of European Commission engagement in the 
Arctic” (ibid.: 6), and the aim to spend 20% of the EU’s 2014-2020 budget on climate-
related activities. 
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Under H2020 Societal Challenge 5 “Climate action, environment, resource efficiency 
and raw materials”, “the Arctic dimension and earth observation” represents a sub-
domain in its own right. In the 2017 call for proposals, € 97 mio out of a total of € 367 
mio were dedicated to this cluster, representing the highest share among the thematic 
sub-domains (e.g. “climate services and decarbonisation”, “circular economy”) 
(European Commission 2018). As of April 2018, the Community Research and 
Development Information Service (CORDIS) database indicates that 67 Arctic-related 
projects have been financed since the start of H2020 (in total 455 such projects were 
financed under all FPs, including both collaborative and individual research projects). 
Currently, the major projects are brought together in the “EU Arctic Cluster”, a network 
of seven Horizon 2020 and one FP7 projects (EUPolarnet 2018). The general funding 
trend is replicated in this cluster: the overwhelming majority of projects is related to 
climate and environmental research as well as geo-observation, with few projects 
looking into, for instance, future maritime transportation opportunities in the Arctic. 
Another major Arctic-related call programmed for 2019 (“LC-CLA-07-2019: The 
changing cryosphere: uncertainties, risks and opportunities”) further confirms this 
trend: amidst several strands focussing on climate change, it contains only one sub-
theme focussing on “the viability of new economic activities – such as resource 
exploitation, shipping and tourism”, but even here the subtitle adds “and their 
ecological and socio-economic impacts and feedbacks at various scales” (European 
Commission 2017: 23). 
 
In the case of France, its research funding has regularly been allocated to “polar 
science” covering both the Arctic and the Antarctic. Specific Arctic research has 
been concentrated within the “French Arctic Initiative” (“Chantier Arctique”), created 
in 2010 to coordinate over 400 French researchers in the natural, social sciences and 
humanities working on the Arctic.7 It is co-organised by the National Centre for 
Scientific Research (CNRS), which operates under the aegis of the Ministry of 
Education and Research, and the French Polar Institute Paul-Emile Victor, a public 
organisation bringing together key players of French polar research (Chantier Arctique 
2018). The Initiative published calls for proposals in 2015-2016, focussing on 
understanding the changing Arctic environment, but has been less active since.  
 
In contrast to France, Finland has continuously and strategically dedicated funding to 
Arctic research. As a key follow-up to the country’s 2013 Arctic strategy, the Academy 
of Finland launched the “Arctic Academy Programme” (ARKTIKO, 2014-2018). It “aims 
to study and understand the change factors affecting the development of the Arctic 
                                                          
7 This represents the main Arctic research-focussed French initiative. French research institutes 
also quite successfully participate in EU-funded Arctic research under H2020, and France ranks 
9th world-wide when it comes to Arctic research (MFA France 2016: 17). 
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region, the transformation process, and the dynamics of change” (Academy of 
Finland 2018), focussing on “key questions … related to understanding economic, 
social, cultural and ecological change”, with a notable emphasis on socioeconomic 
factors (Academy of Finland 2014: 6).8 Consequently, its four main themes are: “good-
quality life in the north; economic activity and infrastructure in Arctic conditions; the 
northern climate and environment; and cross-border Arctic policy” (ibid.). ARKTIKO 
funds 20 international research projects and two international joint projects that 
involve other Arctic countries like Norway (Academy of Finland 2018). The projects 
financed, at around €10 mio annually, are thematically varied. While several address 
environmental issues, a considerable amount deals with socioeconomic topics such 
as “Oil Production networks in the Russian Arctic” and “Understanding the Cultural 
Impacts and Issues of Lapland Mining” (ibid.). Finnish Arctic research funding is thus 
fully reflective of its 2013 strategy. In its rhetoric and action, Finland seems to 
understand sustainable development in the Arctic as being primarily about 
development. 
 
In sum, Arctic-related research programming and project financing have been 
concentrated largely at the EU level, with more limited opportunities in France and 
Finland. For all three cases, actual practice fully corresponds to the previously 
analysed discourse. At the EU level, considerable sums are invested, and they primarily 
concern research aimed at better understanding the changes in the Arctic 
environment. In France, national science funding for Arctic research is limited, but 
where it exists, it tends to privilege environmental issues. In Finland, funding is to a large 
extent geared towards economic opportunities in the Arctic context. These findings 
need to be properly contextualised, however. From the European Commission and 
French perspectives, Arctic science funding has been explicitly used as a vehicle to 
claim a stake in the Arctic and to gain a(n observer) seat in the Arctic Council 
(Interview 3). In that sense, the EU and French strategies involve a form of “science for 
diplomacy”, that is, the instrumental use of science (funding) for the purpose of 
advancing the objective of becoming important players in the Arctic.9  
 
Participation in the Arctic Council  
 
This section examines the funding and participation of the EU (Commission), Finland 
and France in relevant working groups of the Arctic Council, the forum credited with 
                                                          
8 This is currently the main Finnish funding source for Arctic research, modelled on similar 
programmes operated by Canada and the US (Academy of Finland 2014). Other sources, such 
as the Nordic Council’s “Joint Nordic Initiative on Arctic Research” (Nordforsk 2018), exist, and 
Finnish researchers also participate in EU-funded Arctic projects. 
9 ‘Science for diplomacy’ depicts the use of science as a means to advance other foreign 
policy aims, whereas ‘diplomacy for science’ is about how diplomacy can facilitate 
international science cooperation (The Royal Society 2010: v-vi). 
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the shifting of the Arctic from a mere geographical entity to an operational regional 
cooperation framework (Young 2011). The AC’s main tasks involve the promotion of 
cooperation among Arctic states (i.e. ‘permanent participants’), including with regard 
to environmental issues. Finland is one such permanent participant and it is currently 
the chair of the AC (2017-2019). Non-Arctic states may apply for ‘observer status’, a 
status enjoyed by France since 2000. The EU, despite not having obtained this very 
status, is treated as an “observer-in principle” (Koivurova 2016). 
 
The Arctic Council has no budget of its own, and its Secretariat is largely funded by 
Norway (42.5% of the budget) and its permanent participants (57.7%, distributed 
equally) (Arctic Council Secretariat 2016). The AC working groups are funded through 
both direct contributions (mainly from Arctic states) and in-kind contributions/ 
collaborations, usually in the form of individual experts’ working hours (national, 
European and international agencies, observer states, etc.) (ibid.). In 2017, out of €1.8 
million proposed by Finland for Baltic Sea, Barents and Arctic cooperation (Finnish 
Ministry of Finance 2017), €1.3 million were channelled into projects supporting its AC 
chair’s four priority areas (environmental protection, receiving the largest share; 
connectivity; meteorological cooperation; education) (Interview 4). Contrary to 
Finland, no French ministry has a specific budgetary line for AC projects, nor a 
breakdown of the money spent in AC projects (Interview 3). For the EU, there is also no 
specific budgetary line for participation in Arctic governance, which is why it has 
supported its bid for observer status in the AC by pointing to the most tangible 
financing that has flown into Arctic-related matters, which stems from its research 
framework programmes, as discussed above (Immler 2014). 
 
When it comes to promoting environmental protection, the most relevant AC working 
groups are the Arctic Contaminants Action Programme (ACAP), the Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Programme (AMAP) and the Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME).10  
 
In ACAP, only one submission was (co-)authored by the Finnish administration, the 2017 
Framework for the Circumpolar Expansion of the Local Environmental Network (ACAP 
2017a). Another document on the reduction of black carbon (one of the Finnish  
preoccupations (Interviews 1, 2)), was signed by NEFCO, an international finance 
institution with observer status at the AC, which was established by Finland and the 
other Nordic countries (ACAP 2017b). No activity could be detected for the 
Commission and France. 
 
                                                          
10 The analysis relies on eight reports and assessments published by ACAP in the Open Access 
Archive, AMAP’s 15 scientific assessment reports and PAME’s 17 meeting reports.  
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AMAP, the largest and best funded working group (Exner-Pirot 2016), published 15 
scientific reports between 2009 and 2017. Although these documents explain in the 
preface that the list of contributors is not comprehensive and does not include “many 
national institutes, laboratories and organisations, and their staff” (AMAP 2017a), the 
examination of the specific acknowledgements can shed light on the degree of 
participation of the three players. In 14 papers, AMAP thanks the Nordic Council of 
Ministers (including Finland), for its financial support. One of these reports explicitly 
highlights Finland’s role (AMAP 2017b). By contrast, France and the EU (Commission) 
are not mentioned once. 
 
The participation in PAME meetings of Finnish, French and EU representatives is well-
documented in the meeting reports. Although Finland is more active and visible (e.g. 
as co-leader of the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Implementation Progress 
Report), France and the EU have shown an interest in projects such as the Arctic 
Ocean Review and have presented their perspectives on the Arctic (PAME 2018). 
Contrary to the Finnish delegation, which is regularly represented by the Ministry of 
Environment, the French and Commission participation has considerably varied. 
France initially sent an expert from the Ministry of Transport, but from 2015 onwards the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs took over. In the EU’s case, representation has been shared 
among Commission DGs MARE, ENVI and MOVE, as well as with the European Maritime 
Safety Agency and the European Environment Agency, the latter being the only 
official representative attending PAME meetings since 2015.  
 
Altogether, while the visibility of France and the Commission in the AC’s operations is 
very limited, Finland as an Arctic country, permanent participant and current AC chair 
is an active contributor to the Council’s work, including with regard to the 
environment.  
 
Promoting international environmental law for the Arctic  
 
This section probes into the EU’s, Finland’s and France’s activities in the framework of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and of several multilateral 
environmental agreements with particular relevance for the Arctic. All member states 
and the EU are parties to UNCLOS, the main international agreement related to the 
world’s oceans and marine resources. Specifically from an environmental point of 
view, the ongoing discussions under UNCLOS regarding Biodiversity Beyond National 
Jurisdiction (BBNJ) are important for the Arctic, given that the Arctic Ocean is 
biodiversity-rich, but largely falls outside national jurisdictions. Building on its promotion 
of other environmental initiatives within UNCLOS, the EU has played a key role in the 
preparatory stages of the BBNJ talks (Churchill 2018: 17-21), actively pushing for the 
start of the treaty negotiations which kicked off in December 2017 (Interview 1). 
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While no international agreement specifically targets the region, several MEAs 
mention the Arctic and are at least partially aimed at solving Arctic-related issues. Two 
important MEAs concern chemicals: the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants and the 2013 Minamata Convention on Mercury. As the hazardous 
substances regulated by these conventions are persistent, bio-accumulative and 
have long-range transport potential, they can be particularly harmful for the 
vulnerable Arctic environment. The negotiations on both conventions partially started 
in response to the findings of Arctic research programmes (Selin 2014: 5-6). In these 
negotiations, the EU played an ambitious and largely successful leadership role, first 
driven by individual member states such as Sweden, then collectively (Biedenkopf 
2018: 194-196). Since its entry into force, the EU has been an active player regarding 
the addition of chemicals to be prohibited or limited in their use under the Stockholm 
Convention, such as perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) (Chemicalwatch 2015). While it is 
still too early to analyse its role in the implementation of the Minamata Convention, 
the EU and many of its members such as Finland and France perceive this treaty as 
important for the Arctic, despite the fact that some EU members like Italy, Poland and 
Spain have not yet ratified it (UNEP 2018).  
 
Next to pollution from chemicals, a key challenge to the Arctic environment stems 
from heavy fuel oil used in maritime transportation. Heavy fuel oil could be 
environmentally harmful in case of an oil spill, and its combustion releases black 
carbon, reducing the reflecting capacity of the ice-covered Arctic, and thus 
accelerating climate change. In the IMO, the European Arctic countries are pushing 
for a heavy fuel oil ban similar to the one already in place in Antarctic waters. Among 
EU countries, Finland has taken the lead on this matter, together with Germany, The 
Netherlands and Sweden. Most other EU countries, including France, are supportive, 
but seem to be less proactive (Stefanini 2018). 
 
Overall, the EU has thus been rather active in the negotiations of MEAs relevant to the 
Arctic, with Finland being among the most supportive EU members and France among 
the regular, but less proactive supporters. 
 
Extracting key patterns 
 
The probe into the practice of the representatives of the three discourse coalitions on 
EPI in the EU’s Arctic policy largely confirms the results of the discourse analysis. As 
argued above, no ‘discourse structuration’ could be detected in the original sense of 
the term, that is, in the form of a single discourse emerging as dominant when it comes 
to EPI in the EU’s Arctic policy, which could then lead to a pattern of consistent 
institutional practices (Hajer 1993: 47-48). Instead, the co-existence of three discourses 
is replicated through a distinct set of practices, as the behaviour of each of the 
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examined players largely conforms to the discourse of its ‘coalition’, with a nuance 
concerning Finland and further discussed below. Discourses have thus seemingly 
become institutionalised as per cluster of discourse coalition.  
 
When it comes to the Commission as representative of a ‘strong EPI’ discourse coalition 
that is essentially confined to the EU institutions, its actions are mostly concentrated on 
what it can effectively do under its current legal mandate: promoting environmental 
measures through its research funding and multilateral activities, while keeping a lower 
profile in the Arctic Council, in which it is – given Russian resistance in particular – only 
a de facto observer. Its activities – notably the considerable funding that flows into 
Arctic research – do not merely pursue environmental objectives. Instead, they are 
also meant to guarantee the EU a (future) stake in the Arctic.  
 
France is the typical representative of a cluster that includes EU member states with 
an interest in the Arctic and observer status in the AC. It supports an EU policy on the 
Arctic and has, in its self-understanding, a rather ‘balanced’ view of sustainable 
development in the region. France’s primary interest is to be a player in the Arctic. If 
this means employing scientific research (funding) as an access point, it will employ 
such ‘science for Arctic diplomacy’. Additionally, each country has interests in certain 
sectoral policies (e.g. Germany in maritime transport and research, Italy in 
hydrocarbons, Spain in fishing) (Raspotnik 2018: 120-122). Their support to EPI in the 
framework of the EU’s Arctic policy is now moderate, but may be contingent on future 
developments in the region. 
 
Finland as a typical representative of the Nordic countries’ discourse coalition (and 
often acting in concert with them through the Nordic Council) is mainly concerned 
with its own development, and this despite the fact that as a chair of the AC it also 
promotes environmental protection measures. This environmental proactivity requires 
nuancing: although in the AC the Finnish government claims that the “most important” 
concern Arctic states have to address is climate change (Soini 2018; Interview 2), its 
Arctic strategy and actions – as illustrated by the Kirkenes railway infrastructure project 
and its research funding – point to a different conclusion, namely a clear “dualism … 
in the relationship between environmental protection and exploitation of the natural 
resources” in the Arctic (Nykänen 2017: 144; Interview 6). This dualism is expressed in its 
preference for weak EPI in the EU’s Arctic policy. 
 
The pattern that emerges from the discourse and practice analyses is thus that of a 
multi-level EU Arctic policy, in which the EU level (including the Foreign Affairs Council 
as collective voice of the member states) displays a preference for a rather strong EPI, 
whereas at the member state level moderate to weak degrees of EPI indicate a 
EU Diplomacy Paper 3/2018 
29 
privileging of economic opportunities, which may to some extent thwart efforts at the 
EU level. To answer the paper’s research question, at the aggregate EU level this 
pattern currently points to a moderate level of discursive and practical commitment 
to EPI in EU Arctic policy. This commitment remains however fragile given member 
state differences. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Against the backdrop of the ‘Arctic paradox’, this paper set out to investigate the 
extent to which the European Union has integrated environmental concerns into its 
emerging Arctic policy, distinguishing between discursive and practical commitments 
to EPI. It finds that three distinct discourse coalitions and – what could be termed – 
‘practice coalitions’ co-exist when it comes to the extent of EPI in the EU’s Arctic policy: 
at one end of the spectrum ranging from strong to weak EPI, a pro-environmental 
coalition essentially comprises the EU institutions (and the Swedish Environment 
Ministry); at the other end, the Nordic countries pay attention to environmental issues 
to a much more limited extent in the Arctic context, prioritising economic opportunities 
instead; in-between, a strong coalition displaying a moderate attachment to EPI 
comprises big EU member states like France and Germany who desire to be players in 
the Arctic for different, economic interest-related reasons.  
 
This multi-level pattern with an EU-level pro-EPI discourse and action and varying 
member state-level commitments to EPI in discourse and action leads to the 
conclusion that the EU’s aggregate Arctic policy is currently ‘green by omission’ but 
does not represent a “stable and predictable pattern of action” (Stępień 2015: 251). 
With this policy, the EU occupies the space liberated by its members. It can adopt a 
rather solid green discourse and engage in largely uncontroversial activities such as 
research funding, again mostly on environmental issues, as (long as) this does not take 
anything away from its members. At the same time, given legal constraints and interest 
conflicts among the latter, the EU’s current Arctic policy deliberately omits contentious 
issues, leaving the national level to deal with those. As this seems to have become 
widely accepted, discourse structuration (and institutionalisation) regarding EPI in the 
EU’s Arctic policy – in Hajer’s sense – may have occurred ex negativo, that is, on what 
the EU does not say (and does not do).  
 
Against this backdrop, it must be said that the EU does not yet possess a coherent 
Arctic strategy, and that the substance of its Arctic policy has over time actually been 
reduced in ambition (see also Raspotnik 2018: 93-122), in particular when it comes to 
the environment. An – in the official terminology – ‘integrated EU Arctic policy’ that is 
to such an extent ambiguous may have little practical value. Choosing to live with the 
tensions between environmental protection needs and the desire to exploit economic 
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opportunities by sweeping controversies under the carpet of a ‘catch-all’ composite 
policy, the EU currently lacks a compass and risks that its members will not feel bound 
by commitments to sustainable development when ‘anything goes’ in the El Dorado 
of a largely ice-free Arctic.  
 
The likelihood that the ‘Arctic paradox’ will be addressed by opting for a stronger, less 
equivocal EPI in the EU context depends heavily on the scope conditions that allowed 
for the emergence of the status quo. These are related to institutional factors 
(especially the legal framework regulating EU Arctic policy), varying ideas about 
sustainable development and different interests regarding the Arctic. First, the legal 
context is bound to remain unfavourable in the absence of a (highly unlikely) treaty 
reform, especially when it comes to energy resources. Second, despite the particular 
fragility of the Arctic environment, member states are following an ideational stance 
inspired by the predominant sustainable development logic embodied in the ‘Europe 
2020’ narrative, which maintains that the creation of ‘jobs and growth’ should be 
actively pursued in all sectors and circumstances. This ideational positioning comes 
hand-in-hand with strong member state interests concerning primarily energy security. 
To satisfy their needs for a stable and uninterrupted energy supply, many member 
states continue to eye the Arctic. Other economic interests are most strongly and 
comprehensively articulated by the Nordic countries, and related to specific issues 
such as maritime transportation in the case of the non-Arctic, but Arctic-interested EU 
members. At the same time, many member states not discussed in this paper do not 
(yet) have explicit positions on the Arctic (Interviews 5, 6). 
 
Potential for change may lie precisely here, namely by drawing a wider range of 
actors than those with an immediate (economic) interest in the Arctic into 
deliberations about the Arctic paradox. Such a debate needs to involve all member 
states and their publics and focus on the value of the Arctic as a global common 
because “what happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic” (Russell 2015). 
Individual interests, including those of sovereign Arctic states, need to be weighed 
against those of the citizens of the EU and the planet as a whole. This debate must 
result in policies offering clearer guidance to EU and national policy-makers on how to 
address the Arctic paradox. This in turn must be translated into an operational strategy 
indicating what to do and whom to address within the complex geopolitical 
landscape of Arctic governance. If it was serious about its reputation as a global 
‘green leader’, the EU would – rather than durably settle for a broad and inoperable 
policy – provide the forum for such a societal debate on its approach vis-à-vis the new 
frontier constituted by the changing Arctic.  
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